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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case involving a request for a declaratory judgment, 
Appellant filed a Complaint asserting three causes of action. 
The first cause alleged that Appellant's interest in certain 
real property created by a lis pendens filed in connection with a 
divorce action was superior to Respondents1 claimed interest in 
the same property arising by virtue of a Trust Deed given by 
Appellant's wife in this property while the divorce action was 
pending. The Trust Deed had been signed and recorded after 
Appellant's lis pendens had been recorded. 
Both sides agreed there were no issues of material facts 
related to Appellant's first cause and filed cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment on the priority issue. Supporting memoranda 
were submitted by both sides and the matter was argued and 
reported. 
At the conclusion of the arguments, the Trial Court granted 
Respondents' Motion and denied Appellant's Motion and ruled that 
Respondents' Trust Deed had priority over Appellant's interest in 
that portion of the property on which the marital residence was 
located. 
The remaining two causes dealt with claimed deficiencies in 
the Respondents' Notice of Default and a related request for a 
Restraining Order preventing a trustee's sale of the property 
from going forward because of those deficiencies. These causes 
are not at issue on this appeal, the same having been dismissed. 
Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal related to the Trial 
Court's granting of Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
the denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 31, 1981, Plaintiff/Appellant Hans C. Rilling 
(hereinafter "Rilling") married Marsha Lang Rilling [R.57]. 
2. Prior to that marriage, Marsha Lang Riling had been 
awarded an equity and possessory interest in a home and residen-
tial lot located at 2810 Fillmore, Ogden, Utah, in a Decree of 
Divorce from her first husband, Robert F. Lang. The legal 
description of this real estate is: 
Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden City, 
Weber County, Utah: Beginning on the East 
line of Fillmore Avenue, 280.81 feet South 
2 
58f East of 28th Street; thence South 89°2' 
East 150 feet; thence North 58! West 10 feet; 
thence North 59°29f40" West 172.41 feet, more 
or less, to Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58' 
West to beginning. 
Also, a Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden 
City, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at a 
point 480 feet North 0° 58' East from the 
Southwest corner of said Block 4, and running 
thence North 0° 58f 120 feet along the East 
side of Fillmore Avenue; thence South 89° 02f 
East 280.89 feet; thence South 0° 58' West 
120 feet; thence North 89° 02f West 280.89 
feet to the place of beginning. Situated in 
the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of Section 34, Township 6 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake City Meridian, U.S. 
Survey. [R.57-58]. 
The property consists of two contiguous parcels. This first 
parcel (Parcel A) is the larger of the two and is the one on 
which the home is located and is legally described in the first 
paragraph of the two-part description. The second parcel (Parcel 
B) is smaller, contains no improvements and is legally described 
in the second paragraph of the two-part description. 
3. The following diagram taken from the plat demonstrates 
the size of each parcel and the location of each in relation to 
each other and Fillmore Avenue: 
\ 
see P. 9% 
^ 
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4. The entire property was brought by Marsha Lang Rilling 
into the marriage with Rilling and was subsequently used as their 
marital residence until their separation. Rilling, during the 
course of the marriage, made substantial investments in, and 
improvements to, the property [R.58]. 
5. When Marsha Lang Rilling filed for divorce against 
Rilling, he filed an answer and a lis pendens related to the 
divorce action and his interest in the above-described real 
property. The lis pendens was recorded on May 11, 19 83, with 
the Weber County Recorder's Office [R.18]. (A copy of the 
document which was recorded has been included as Exhibit "A" in 
the Addendum to this Brief.) The lis pendens gave notice that a 
divorce action was then pending between Marsha Lang Rilling and 
Hans C. Rilling, and that the action involved the parties' title 
to and interest in the real property located at 2810 Fillmore 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah. The lis pendens on its face contained the 
correct legal description of the smaller parcel (Parcel B). It 
also referred to an attached valuation notice and stated, 
"Attached is the valuation notice also setting forth the legal 
description." It did not contain the legal description on the 
larger parcel (Parcel A). 
6. In 1983, while the above described divorce action was 
still pending, Marsha Lang Rilling applied for a loan from 
Respondent, First Security Financial (hereinafter FSF), and, in 
conjunction with that loan, gave a second Deed of Trust to FSF in 
all of 2810 Fillmore (Parcel A and Parcel B) [R.76]. The funds 
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were disbursed on or about November 4, 1983, and the Deed of 
Trust was recorded in the Weber County Recorder's Office on 
November 8, 1983 [R.76]. 
7. Michael V. Lewis, for reasons not known, researched the 
title to the property in question for FSF on November 9, 1983, 
one day after the Trust Deed was recorded and stated that the 
only interest of Rilling he discovered was the lis pendens which 
had been recorded on May 11, 1983. He stated in his Affidavit 
the following: 
2. I am and for in excess of 10 years 
have been employed and engaged in the business 
of title insurance, abstracting, real property 
titles, and related subjects. . . . 
4. I last examined title to the tracts 
of property described above on 11-9-83. That 
examination disclosed that as of November 9, 
1983, there was no instrument recorded at the 
office of the Weber County Recorder indicating 
any potential interest in the two tracts of 
property described above (or either of them) 
in favor of Hans C. Rilling except the Lis 
Pendens, a certified copy of which is 
attached hereto marked Exhibit "A." The Lis 
Pendens describes only Tract 1. TJiis Lis 
Pendens contains no legal description of any 
part of Tract 2. [R.81-82]. 
8. The Preliminary Title Report ordered by FSF in relation 
to the loan request of Ms. Lang, contained no reference to the 
lis pendens which had earlier been recorded by Rilling. (See 
FSF's Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Production of 
Documents and Affidavit of Joseph Caldiero [R.76-77].) 
9. A Decree of Divorce was entered on September 19, 1984, 
and it provided, in relevant part, that use and possession of the 
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2810 Fillmore property was awarded to Marsha Rilling, subject to 
her assuming any obligations owed thereon, and further subject to 
a lien in favor of Rilling in the sum of $53,493.00, payable to 
him without interest upon sale of the property. The Decree 
further provided that the property was to be sold [R.59]. (A 
copy of the Decree of Divorce is included as Exhibit "B" in the 
Addendum to this Brief.) 
10. Rilling had no notice or knowledge of FSF's Trust Deed 
until the trial of the divorce action on February 16, 1984 
[R.60]. 
11. On June 4, 1985, FSF recorded a Notice of Default and 
attempted to foreclose its Deed of Trust. It claimed its 
interest in the property was prior in time and superior to that 
of Rilling [R.60]. 
12. Prior to the Trustee's Sale which had been scheduled by 
FSF, Rilling filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
seeking, among other things, a determination from the Court as to 
whose interest in the property as between Rilling and FSF was 
superior [R.l-26; R.60]. 
13. FSF and Defendant, Kay Lewis, FSFfs Trustee, answered 
and responded to discovery propounded by Rilling. Both parties 
then filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment and memoranda and 
affidavits in support of their respective positions [R.55-56; 
R.97-98; R.118-121] . 
14. The parties agreed there were no material facts in 
dispute and argued their motions to the Trial Court [R.133, 136, 
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147]. The proceeding was reported [R.135-158]. During the 
course of the arguments, FSF admitted that Rilling had a superior 
interest in the smaller parcel (Parcel B) by reason of the lis 
pendens, which had been recorded before FSF's second Deed of 
Trust [R.147]. 
15. At the conclusion of the arguments, the Trial Court 
ruled that Rilling1s position in the smaller parcel was superior 
to FSF's position, but that because the lis pendens did not 
contain the legal description of the larger parcel, FSF's posi-
tion in the larger parcel was superior to that of Rilling!s and 
in so ruling relied on the case of Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d 915 
(Wash. App. 1971) [R.118-122; 156-157]. 
14. The parties stipulated to dismiss the remaining counts 
of Rilling1s Complaint related to deficiencies in FSF's attempted 
Trust Deed foreclosure, and an Order of Dismissal was subsequently 
entered and Rilling timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the Trial 
Court's ruling on the issue of priority of interest in the larger 
parcel of the subject property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Rilling1s lis pendens was properly recorded on May 11, 1983, 
and gave FSF constructive notice of Rilling1s interest in the 
subject property, pursuant to § 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1983), 
and is superior to FSF's interest created by its Deed of Trust 
recorded on November 8, 1983. Consequently, FSF took subject to 
7 
Rilling's interest in the subject property and FSF's lien in the 
property is junior and inferior to Rilling's lien granted under 
the Decree of Divorce. 
A. 
FSF acquired only the interest of Marsha Lang Rilling in the 
property, subject to whatever disposition the Court might make of 
it in the pending divorce action. 
B. 
Under the circumstances, FSF should have made further 
inquiry as to the status of the property, and it failed to do so 
prior to taking its Deed of Trust. 
C. 
The Trial Court's reliance on the case of Koch v. Swanson, 
481 P.2d 915 (Wash. App. 1971) was misplaced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S LIS PENDENS WAS PROPERLY RECORDED BEFORE 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL'S INTEREST WAS RECORDED 
AND, THEREFORE, APPELLANT'S INTEREST IN THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS SUPERIOR TO THAT OF 
RESPONDENT FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL 
A. 
Appellant's Lis 
Constructive 
Interest in 
Pendens Gave Respondents 
Notice of Appellant's 
the Subject Property 
Section 78-40-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
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In any action affecting title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
pendency of the action, containing the names 
of the parties, the object of the action or 
defense, and a description of the property in 
that county affected thereby. From the time 
of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names. Id. 
Under this provision in order for the lis pendens to consti-
tute constructive notice to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the 
property affected thereby the recorded notice must contain: (1) 
the names of the parties; (2) the object of the action or defense; 
and (3) a description of the property affected thereby. 
In the present case, the lis pendens filed by Rilling on May 
11, 1983, indicated that a divorce action was pending in Weber 
County. It gave the names of both parties and it identified 
Marsha Lang Rilling by both her prior married name of "Rilling" 
and her prior married name of "Lang," the name she used in 
applying for the loan with FSF. It contained the address of the 
entire property (a single family residence), an accurate legal 
description of one of the two parcels making up the subject 
property and a reference to an attached valuation notice with an 
additional legal description. FSFfs Trust Deed was not recorded 
until November 8, 1983, and it contained the description of 
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Parcel A and the description of Parcel B, which was also included 
in Rilling's lis pendens. 
The fact that Rillingfs lis pendens described only a portion 
of the subject property does not limit Rillingfs claim of interest 
only to that portion. Section 78-40-2, supra, requires only that 
the notice give a description of the property — it does not 
specifically require a complete legal description. All that is 
necessary is a description which is sufficient to give a purchaser 
or encumbrancer constructive notice of the pendency of the action 
and the property which may be affected by the outcome of that 
action. In this case, the fact that the notice gave the correct 
street address of the entire property and a correct legal 
description of one of the parcels comprising the residential lot, 
is sufficient to satisfy the description requirement of the 
statute. 
Rilling1s lis pendens also clearly gave FSF notice that a 
divorce action was pending between Marsha Lang Rilling and Hans 
C. Rilling and that any property owned by those two parties would 
be subject to the divorce action. As was stated in Hidden 
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979): 
The sole purpose of recording a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of proceedings which may be derog-
atory to an owner's title or right to 
possession, [footnote] One who takes with 
full knowledge that the property taken is the 
subject of on-going litigation acquires only 
the grantor's interest therein, subject to 
whatever disposition the court might make of 
it. [footnote] Id. at 1248. 
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(See also, Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1978); Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 654 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982).) 
In this case, there was sufficient information in the public 
record to alert FSF of Killing's claim of interest in the 
property to place FSF on constructive, if not actual, notice of 
the status of the title to the 2810 Fillmore property. The Trial 
Court erred in concluding that Rilling's lis pendens was insuffi-
cient to place FSF on notice of Rilling's claimed interest in the 
property. 
B. 
Respondents Should Have Made Further 
Inquiry as to the Status 
of the Property 
Under the undisputed facts of this case, FSF should have 
made further inquiry as to the status of the property before 
accepting Ms. Lang's Trust Deed and advancing her loan proceeds. 
The general rule on notice and lis pendens is set forth in 8 
Thompson on Real Property, § 4308 (1963) , entitled "Lis Pendens 
as Constructive Notice." It states that: 
If the facts suggest further inquiry, the lis 
pendens is notice of any other facts which 
could have been ascertained in the pursuit of 
such inquiry with ordinary prudence and 
diligence. Id. at 338. 
See also, 51 Am. Jur.2d, Lis Pendens § 20 (1970). 
In this case, the legal description in the lis pendens did 
"suggest further inquiry" on the part of FSF. Had such inquiry 
been conducted, FSF would have discovered that a dispute existed 
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between the owners of the 2810 Fillmore Avenue property, Marsha 
Lang Rilling and Hans C. Rilling, regarding their respective 
interests in the entire property not just in the parcel specif-
ically described to in the formal legal description in Rilling1s 
lis pendens, At the very least, it placed FSF on notice that 
Rilling was claiming an interest in at least one-half of the 
subject property given his status as Ms. Lang's husband. 
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that Mr. Lewis, 
an experienced person evidently hired by FSF to research title to 
this property on November 9, 1983, one day after FSF had recorded 
Marsha Lang's Trust Deed, discovered and noted the existence of 
Rilling's lis pendens. He specifically states: 
4. 1 last examined title to the tracts 
of property described above on 11-9-83. That 
examination disclosed that as of November 9, 
1983, there was no instrument recorded at the 
office of the Weber County Recorder indicating 
any potential interest in the two tracts of 
property described above (or either of them) 
in favor of Hans C. Rilling except the Lis 
Pendens, a certified copy of which is 
attached hereto marked Exhibit "A.lf The Lis 
Pendens describes only Tract 1. This Lis 
Pendens contains no legal description of any 
part of Tract 2. [R.81-82]. 
The most reasonable explanation is that the title company 
employed by FSF in October of 1983 missed Rilling's lis pendens 
when searching title in connection with FSF's loan to and trust 
deed from Marsha Lang Rilling. That explanation is most 
plausible when the preliminary title report which referred to 
both parcels of the property did not mention, nor except from 
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coverage, the lis pendens which specifically described and 
affected one of those parcels. 
A pivotal fact in this case is that the property involved, 
while technically consisting of two parcels, was used in its 
entirety as a single family residence. As such, Rilling1s lis 
pendens, setting out the address of the entire property, a 
partial legal description and the fact that Hans and Marsha 
Rilling were involved in a divorce proceeding wherein Rilling 
claimed an interest in the property, would, at a minimum, put any 
party of "ordinary prudence and diligence" on notice of Rilling1s 
possible claims and would compel further inquiry regarding the 
status of Hans and Marsha Lang Rillingfs respective interests in 
this family residence. FSF, as an experienced and professional 
lender, dealing regularly with real estate transactions, was 
under an affirmative duty (perhaps even more than a person of 
"ordinary prudence and diligence") to inquire into the status of 
Rilling1s claims in light of the lis pendens that had been 
recorded and was a matter of public record. FSF did not fulfill 
this duty and, therefore, is precluded from now claiming its 
interest in the property should be afforded priority over 
Rilling1s. 
C. 
The Trial Court's Reliance on the Holding of 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d 915 (Wash. App. 1971) 
in Finding for the Respondents was Erroneous 
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In granting FSF's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial 
Court said it was persuaded by the holding in Koch v. Swanson, 
supra, a case urged as dispositive by FSF. The Trial Court 
stated: 
I think the Koch or Coach case, however you 
pronounce it, is persuasive to me, where the 
Lis Pendens very clear on its face describes 
a tract of land at a location will not 
require persons put on notice to wonder 
whether it includes other tracts located at 
the same address. . . . [R.156-157]. 
In taking this position, the Trial Court did not consider 
and follow the rule that imposes a duty to inquire further into 
the status of title to property should there be information in 
the public record which would reasonably alert an inquiring party 
of claims of interest in and to that property. In this case, the 
information contained on the lis pendens was such that FSF should 
have made further inquiry. The use of the entire address consti-
tuted notice as to both parcels. It would not have been necessary 
for FSF to have searched all county records to find the status of 
Parcel A -- the address should have immediately directed FSF to 
it. Likewise, the lis pendens as recorded was sufficient to give 
FSF notice that a divorce action was pending between Rilling and 
his wife and that the property at 2810 Fillmore Avenue, would be 
subject to the divorce action. This information fulfills the 
sole purpose of a lis pendens as expressed in Hidden Meadows Dev. 
Co. v Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), by giving "constructive 
notice of a pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an 
owner's title or right to possession." Id., at 1248. FSF had 
14 
access to this information, had its title searcher not overlooked 
the lis pendens when searching title to the property which had 
two legal descriptions attributable to it. 
In reaching its decision, the Trial Court concluded that 
this case was very similar to Koch, supra, and that the position 
urged by Rilling would place too onerous a burden on parties 
searching title to property. That reliance on Koch, supra, is 
misplaced. In Koch, supra, the Plaintiff's mortgage was errone-
ously described as pertaining to "Tract 125." They brought suit 
against the individual mortgagee and the second mortgagor whose 
mortgage correctly described the same property as "Tract 124." 
That court concluded that it would be an impossible burden to 
expect a party to search beyond the county auditor's records to 
find the encumbrance on the erroneously recorded tract. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable. In Koch, the 
defendant had no clue as to where to go to inquire further. In 
our case, FSF did not have to go on a blind search, not knowing 
where or what to inquire. The street address and legal descrip-
tion of one parcel was like a road sign directing FSF to exactly 
where it needed to make further inquiry. It would not have had 
to check all the records, but simply inquire as to the status of 
Parcel A from Ms. Lang, Rilling or Plaintiff's attorney, Paul 
Liapis, all of whom were identified on the recorded lis pendens. 
That is not the onerous burden the Koch court sought to avoid. 
For these reasons, Koch is not a sound basis for the Trial 
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Court's decision. The Trial Court's decision to grant FSF's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and deny Rilling's Motion was 
incorrect, was based upon inapplicable authority and did not 
follow the law pertaining to a parties1 duty to inquire further 
when there is information of public record which would reasonably 
require further inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed 
and Rillingfs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Rillingfs lis pendens was recorded on May 11, 1983, and FSF's 
Trust Deed was not recorded until November 8, 1983. There is no 
dispute that Rilling's lis pendens gave the street address of the 
entire parcel of property, an accurate legal description of one 
of the two parcels comprising the property and identified all 
parties to the pending divorce action. Because the description 
of property included in Rillingfs lis pendens was sufficient to 
give FSF constructive notice of Rilling!s interest in the property 
and of the pendency of an action concerning the property; and 
because the information contained in the lis pendens, if it had 
been discovered and reviewed by FSF as it should have been, 
required that FSF make further inquiry regarding the status of 
Hans C. Rilling's and Marsha Lang Rillingfs respective interests 
in the property. Since FSF failed to make such inquiry, FSF, and 
not Rilling, should be placed in a subordinate position in 
relation to the competing interests in the property. Appellant 
16 
is entitled to a Summary Judgment in his favor and his costs 
related to this appeal. The Trial Court's decision should be 
reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /^ day of January, 1987. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING/& LIAPIS 
KEltfT M. KAST^ lflG 
Attorneys for Appellant 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed to the following: 
BRUCE A. MAAK, ESQ. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KAY M. LEWIS, ESQ. 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this //7 day of January, 1987 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARSHA LANG RILLING, 
Plaintiff, : LIS PENDENS 
v. 
HANS C. RILLING,, 
Defendant, : Civil No. 84224 
ooOoo 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a divorce action has been 
commenced and is now pending in this Court as against the 
above-named Defendant, and said action, among other things, 
involves the above-named parties' title to and interest in 
the following described real property located at 2810 Fillmore 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah, Weber County, State of Utah: 
Part of Block 4, Maule Addition, Ogden City, Weber 
County, Utah: Beginning on the East line of Fillmore 
Avenue, 280.81 feet South 58' East of 28th Street, 
thence South 89°2f East 150 feet; thence North 58 ' 
West 10 feet; thence North 59°29,40" West 172.41 feet 
more or less to Fillmore Avenue, thence South 58' 
West to beginning. 
Attached is the valuation notice also setting forth the legal 
description. 
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DATED t h i._2 day o f May, 1 9 8 3 . 
GUSTIN, ADAFf<f,y KASTING & LIAPIS 
a^f^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the Q day of May, 1983, personally appeared before 
me Paul H. Liapis, who being first duly sworn upon oath, 
acknowledged to ire that said individual has read the foregoing 
Lis Pendens, believes the contents thereof, and executed the 
same of said individuals free act and desire. 
^KMy > Oomnjissrion Expires: 
- > 
tRY PUBLIC J 
iding at Salt Lake City, Utah 
A-
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FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 39 4-7709 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA LANG RILLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HANS C. RILLING, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 84244 
The above entitled matter was tried before the 
Court on the 16th day of February, 1984, the Honorable RONALD 
O. HYDE presiding. The plaintiff and the defendant were 
each personally present and represented by their respective 
counsel, FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY and PAUL H. LIAPIS. The parties 
were sworn and testified, and exhibits were marked, 
identified, and received by the Court, Each of the parties 
rested their respective cases and argued the matter to the 
Court. The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein, and being 
fully advised in the premises, now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as follows: 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a decree of 
divorce, divorcing them from the other, which divorces shall 
become final and absolute upon entry of the divorce decree, 
2. The plaintiff is awarded the property and 
premises known as 2810 Fillmore Avenue, more fully described 
as follows: 
A part of Block 4, Maule Addition to Ogden, 
Utah: Beginning on the East line of Fillmore 
Avenue, 280*81 feet South 58f East of 28th 
Street; thence South 89#02f East 1S0 feet; 
thence North 58• West 10 feet; thence North 
59#29,40f' West 172.41 feet, more or less, to 
Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58' West to 
beginning. 
Also, a part of Block 4, Maule Addition to 
Ogden City, Utah: Beginning at a point 480 
feet North 0*58' East from the Southwest corner 
of said Block 4, and running thence North 0*58' 
East 120 feet along the East side of Fillmore 
Avenue; thence South 89#02f East 280.89 feet; 
thence South 0#58f West 120 feet; thence North 
89#02f West 280.89 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
|| Situated in the Southwest Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 6 
North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake City Meridian, 
U. S. Survey. 
Subject to the mortgage debts owing, which she shall assume 
and pay, saving the defendant harmless therefrom, and subject 
to the defendant's investment equity therein in the sum of 
$53,493.00, payable to him, without interest, upon the sale 
of said property. 
3. The property and premises known as 2810 
Fillmore Avenue, Ogden, Utah, more fully described in the 
preceding paragraph, are forthwith to be sold, and the 
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plaintiff and the defendant are required to fully cooperate 
with each other in effecting a sale. Should a licensed real 
estate broker be engaged to assist in the sale of the 
property and premises, the defendant is entitled to make 
inquiry of said broker to determine efforts being made in 
accomplishing a sale and progress being experienced. The 
defendant is required to pay 33-1/3 percent of all costis of 
sale incurred in connection with the 6ale of said property 
and premises, together with 33-1/3 percent of annual general 
property taxes until said property and premises are sold. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded the following 
described personal properties: 
(a) The personal properties owned and 
possessed by her prior to the parties1 marriage. 
(b) The gifts of jewelry made to her by the 
defendant, including the engagement/wedding ring. 
(c) Her personal checking and savings 
accounts, if any. 
(d) Her personal automobile, subject to debts 
owing against the same, which she shall assume and pay, 
saving the defendant harmless therefrom. 
(e) Her personal effects and belongings. 
5. The defendant is awarded the following 
described personal properties: 
(a) The personal properties owned and 
LAW o r n c c 
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possessed by him prior to the parties' marriage, including 
silver service given to him as a gift by his mother, 
(b) His personal checking and savings 
accounts, if any. 
(c) His personal automobile, subject to debts 
owing against the same, which he shall assume and pay, saving 
the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(d) The Utah Valley Limited Partnership 
investment. 
(e) His personal effects and belongings. 
6. The defendant is awarded the items of furniture 
subject to the Dinwoodys' debt, should he indicate to the 
plaintiff his desire to have them. 
7. The plaintiff is awarded the sum of $6,000.00, 
representing her interest in the increase in the defendant's 
retirement account with the University of Utah, which total 
sum shall be paid to her by the defendant at the rate of 
$250.00 per month for 24 consecutive months following entry 
of the divorce decree. 
8. Neither of the parties is awarded alimony. 
9. The plaintiff is required to assume and pay the 
following debts and obligations, saving the defendant 
harmless therefrom: 
(a) The real property mortgages hereinabove 
described. 
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(b) Nieman-Marcus. 
(c) Bananas* 
(d) Nordstroms. 
(e) Bettie Marsh-
(f) Utah Educational Loan Services, 
(g) Weinstocks. 
(h) First Security Bank (VISA), 
(i) Intermountain Dermatology Foundation, 
(j) Texaco. 
<k) Feminine Fitness World. 
(1) Any other obligations incurred by her in 
her own name since filing of the divorce Complaint. 
10. The defendant is required to assume and pay the 
following debts and obligations, saving the plaintiff 
harmless therefrom: 
(a) Continental Bank (master card). 
(b) American Savings and Loan (VISA). 
<c) The debt and obligation owing his mother. 
<d) Dinwoodys. 
<e) Any other obligations incurred by him in 
his own name since filing of the divorce Complaint. 
11. The plaintiff and the defendant will file 
amended tax returns for the year 1982, if by doing so the tax 
liability of the plaintiff will not change or alter in any 
way to her detriment or disadvantage. 
CAW orncc 
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12. The plaintiff is restored her former name of 
LANG. 
13. Each of the parties is required to assume and 
pay their individual attorney's fees and costs of action 
incurred. 
DATED this day of^^^nJUt., 1984. 
RONALD 0. HYDE, DISTRICT JUDGE 
APPROVED/AS .TO FARM AND CONTENT 
PAUL H.^LTAPTJ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to PAUL H. LIAPIS, 
attorney foe defendant, 3rd Floor, New York Building, 48 Post 
Office Plaza, Salt Lake City Utah 84101, postage prepaid, on 
this j(W\6ay of ^y^fS^Loj # 1984. 
